The Learning Cost of Interest Rate Reversals* In this Paper, we suggest a new motivation for why central banks appear averse to reversing recent changes in their interest rate. We show, in a standard monetary model with forward-looking expectations, data uncertainty and parameter uncertainty, that there is a learning cost associated with interest rate reversals. A policy that frequently reverses the interest rate makes it more difficult for the central bank and private agents to learn the key parameters of the model. Optimal monetary policy internalizes this learning cost and therefore has a lower number of interest rate reversals. The incentive to reduce the number of interest rate reversals is in addition to the optimal policy inertia created by the presence of forward-looking expectations and uncertainty in the model. JEL Classification: D83, E52 and E58
Introduction
One of the most striking features of central bank behaviour is their apparent reluctance to reverse recent interest rate changes. In many countries, monetary policy tends to be characterised by runs of successive interest rate movements in the same direction, with only rare reversals during which the interest rate moves in the opposite direction to recent changes. The Federal Reserve is particularly averse to interest rate reversals. In the US, it is approximately ten times more likely that a rise in the interest rate will be followed by another rise, rather than a fall, in the interest rate. A significant literature on interest rate smoothing has developed in an attempt to rationalise the lack of reversals in central bank policy. The explanations that have been subject to formal analysis are the presence of forward-looking expectations, Woodford (1999) , data uncertainty, Orphanides (1998) , and parameter uncertainty, Sack (2000) . 1 The purpose of this paper is to suggest that learning provides an additional motivation for central banks to refrain from interest rate reversals.
We show that, if expectations are forward looking and there is data and parameter uncertainty, then it is more difficult for the central bank and private agents to learn the key features of the monetary transmission mechanism if there are frequent reversals in monetary policy. Optimal monetary policy under learning is therefore characterised by less interest rate reversals, so that learning is promoted and welfare is improved. The incentive for interest rate smoothing due to learning is in addition to the optimal policy inertia 1 The empirical evidence for these and other explanations is discussed in Sack and Wieland (2000) . 3 created by the presence of forward-looking expectations and uncertainty in the model.
To establish our result, we allow the central bank and private agents to learn the parameters of a standard monetary model (the New-Keynesian framework of, inter alia, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), McCallum and Nelson (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) ). In contrast to the adaptive learning literature associated with Evans and Honkapohja (2001), we assume that both the central bank and private agents learn rationally using all available information. This has the advantage that we can derive optimal monetary policy, assuming either that the central bank ignores learning (passive learning) or that the central bank internalises learning (active learning), without being subject to the Lucas critique. We solve the model by simulation using the parameterised expectations method of den Haan and Marcet (1990) to capture the non-linearities inherent in learning.
Our results show that the active learning policy which internalises learning has less interest rate reversals than the passive learning policy that ignores learning.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we outline our model and derive the first order conditions for the optimal policy under passive and active learning. Section 3 discusses our calibration and solution method.
The results are presented in Section 4, which examines the nature of optimal monetary policy under passive and active learning. A final section concludes. 4 
Analytical framework
To obtain our results, we introduce uncertainty and learning into a standard optimising model of inflation and output determination. We adopt the forward-looking analytical framework of Woodford (1999) , which can be interpreted as the log-linearised equilibrium conditions of a simple intertemporal general equilibrium model with sticky prices. A role for learning is introduced by assuming that the central bank and private agents only have imprecise estimates of the structural parameters of the model. These estimates are then updated through learning as new information is received. In what follows, we focus on the role of learning and only offer a mathematical outline of the rest of the model. Readers wanting a more detailed economic explanation of the framework should consult Woodford (ibid.).
Structure of the model
The structure of the model consists of an intertemporal IS equation (1) and an aggregate supply equation (2) . These equations show the structural relationship between the output gap, x t , inflation, ¼ t , and the short-term nominal interest rate, r t . The short-term nominal interest rate is assumed to be the instrument of monetary policy.
The term r n t is Wicksell's natural rate of interest and corresponds to the equilibrium real rate of interest that would prevail if prices in the economy were flexible. It is given exogenously by equation (3) . The task of monetary policy in this model is to respond to (possibly persistent) shocks in the Wicksellian natural rate.
To introduce parameter uncertainty and a motivation for learning in the model, we assume that the structural parameter · t in equation (2) is timevarying but cannot be observed directly by either the central bank or private agents. Fundamentally, the parameter · t is assumed to follow a two-state hidden Markov process, switching between high and low values with probability 1 −°. Assuming°> 0:5, the probability of switching values is lower than the probability of continuing with the same value so the process generating · t has persistence. 2 However, since · t is unobservable, the central bank and private agents have to infer its current value of the basis of past observations of the output gap and inflation. The inference problem is complicated by the presence of an unobserved measurement error in inflation, " t , which corresponds to data uncertainty and is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation ¾ " .
Beliefs
The central bank and private agents are unable to observe the structural parameter · t directly and so have to form a belief about whether it is currently high or low. Since the central bank and private agents have the same information, their beliefs always coincide and there is no scope for asymmetry. Under symmetry, the beliefs of the central bank and private agents can be summarised by a single variable, p t = P (· t = · h ), the belief at time t that the structural parameter · t currently has a high value. If p t = 1 then there is complete certainty that · t = · h . Similarly, p t = 0 implies certainty
Learning
The beliefs of the central bank and private agents are updated in the model as new information is received. To learn, the central bank and private agents must assess whether the observed output gap and inflation are most consistent with a high or low value for the structural parameter · t . Equations (4) and (5) show the predicted distribution of inflation, conditional on the value of the structural parameter · t . The central bank and private agents have to infer whether observed inflation is most likely to have come from distribution (4) or (5). 
p + t represents the optimal inference of the current value of the structural parameter · t , given the realisation of inflation ¼ t . The central bank and private agents then make a prediction, p t+1 , of which value of · t will apply in the next period, taking into account the probability that · t may switch in the meantime. Equation (7) shows how this prediction is calculated as a weighted average of the probability of · t being high and remaining high and the probability that · t was low but switches to being high for the next period.
Equations (6) and (7), together with the predicted distributions (4) and (5), define a non-linear equation (8) for updating beliefs. Substituting for inflation using the aggregate supply equation (2), updated beliefs can be written as a function of the initial belief, the output gap and the unobserved measurement error. 
Central bank objective function
Following Woodford (1999), we assume that the central bank minimises a loss function of the form (9) . The discount factor satisfies 0 <¯< 1 and the period-by-period loss function is defined by equation (10) .
The 
Optimal policy
Optimal monetary policy requires the central bank to commit to a dynamic path for short-term nominal interest rate to minimise the present discounted value of expected current and future losses. The policy will not generally be time consistent. The minimisation problem of the central bank is shown in equations (11)- (16). The central bank minimises the expected loss defined by equations (9) and (10), subject to the IS curve (1) and the aggregate supply curve (2) . To ease the mathematical solution of the model, we introduce the notation ¼ h t and ¼ l t to denote the levels of inflation generated by the predicted distributions (4) and (5). In other words, ¼ h t is the level of inflation conditional on the structural parameter · t taking the value · h . Similarly,
With this notation, the aggregate supply curve constraint can be divided into two components, (13) and (14) , and there is an additional constraint (15) on the consistency of expectations.
s:t:
The final constraint (16) is the learning mechanism by which the cen-tral bank and private agents update their beliefs when new information is received. It is fully specified by equation (8) The first order conditions for optimal passive and active learning policies can be derived using standard Lagrangian techniques. Full details of their derivation are contained in Appendix A. In what follows, we restrict ourselves to the economic interpretation of the first order conditions and a discussion of the differences between the optimal passive and active learning policies.
Passive learning
The optimal passive learning policy ignores the learning constraint and so only satisfies the set of first order conditions (17)- (21), obtained in Appendix A by optimising with respect to ¼ t ; ¼ h t ; ¼ l t ; x t and r t . Á 1t · · · Á 4t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the IS curve, the conditional aggregate supply curves and the expectations consistency constraint respectively. We only consider bounded solutions to these equations and so avoid the issue of transversality conditions. In general, the optimal passive learning policy is not time-consistent. It involves elements of commitment due to the presence of lagged multiplier terms. We follow Giannoni and Woodford (2002) and restrict ourselves to policies that are optimal from a 'timeless perspective'.
The first order conditions (17)- (21) are equivalent to those derived by Woodford (1999) , except for additional terms due to uncertainty surrounding the structural parameter · t . If p t = 1 or p t = 0 then · t is know with certainty and our first order conditions exactly coincide. We therefore refer readers to Woodford (ibid.) for more discussion on the economic intuition of the system of equations (17)-(21). The passive learning policy that is defined by our first order conditions arises in the Woodford (ibid.) model if there is parameter uncertainty.
Active learning
The optimal active learning policy internalises the learning constraint so there is an additional equation and Lagrange multiplier in the first order conditions (22)-(27), the full derivation of which appears in Appendix A.
is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the learning constraint. Compared to the conditions for the optimal passive learning policy, the optimal active learning policy has extra terms in equation (25), the first order condition for the output gap. The extra terms are superscripted to indicate that they are the value of a variable conditional on beliefs. For example, x s t+1 is the value of the output gap at time t+1, conditional on beliefs p t+1 being equal to s.
To gain an insight into the role of learning in the first order conditions, it is useful to rewrite the additional first order condition in the form of equation (28). Written in this way, the Lagrange multiplier Á ¹ 5t has an intuitive economic interpretation.
is equal to the sum of the expected period-by-period loss and the discounted value of Á 5t+1 expected for the next period, both expectations being conditional on current beliefs satisfying p t = ¹. The additional first order condition is analogous to a value function, with a one-period return and a continuation value. It measures the value to the central bank of having a belief ¹ at time t.
The analogy to a value function helps explain the presence of the extra terms in the first order condition (25) for the output gap. At the margin, a change in the output gap x t will affect the expected distribution of future beliefs through the process of learning. The extra terms therefore capture the fact that changes in x t will have an effect on forward-looking expectations of the output gap, inflation and continuation value because the changes affect the expected distribution of future beliefs. 4 
Calibration and solution
We use the parameter values of Woodford (1999) as a baseline calibration of the model. The only additional parameters are the two possible values for the structural parameter · t , the probability 1−°of switching between them, and the standard deviation of the measurement error, ¾ " . We set · l = 0:024 following Woodford (ibid.) and allow · h = 0:036. This implies that the sacrifice ratio is 50% lower when · t takes its high value. The probability of switching is calibrated at 1 −°= 0:025, so the average duration over which 
Results
In Sections 4.1 to 4.4 we report the results of simulating our model under the optimal passive and active learning policies. In each case, we adopt the baseline calibration presented in Section 3. In Section 4.5, we check the sensitivity of our results to changes in the calibrated parameters.
Persistence
The persistence properties of the passive and active learning policies are shown in Figure 1 , which plots the estimated first-order autocorrelation coefficient for the short-term nominal interest rate, as a function of beliefs. 6 5 A standard iterative approach such as the one suggested by Wieland (2000) cannot be used because our commitment policies are not time-consistent and so do not satisfy
Bellman's dynamic programming principle. A GAUSS program to solve our model and test its accuracy is available from the author on request. 6 The estimates in Turning to the active learning policy, we observe that the short-term nominal interest rate is more persistent than it was under the passive learning policy at every level of beliefs. The effect is amplified when beliefs are around 0.5, the value associated with maximum uncertainty. The increased persistence induced by the active learning policy is the central result of our paper. In the simulations, we find that internalising learning creates an additional incentive for persistence in the short-term nominal interest rate, especially when uncertainty is high. The active learning policy therefore implies more persistence in the short-term nominal interest rate and a greater degree of interest rate smoothing. The remainder of our paper is devoted to developing the economic intuition and assessing the robustness of this result.
Impulse response functions
Increased persistence in the short-term nominal rate of interest under active learning is also apparent in the reaction of the central bank to shocks in the Wicksellian natural rate of interest. Figure 2 shows the response of the short-term nominal interest rate to a one standard deviation positive shock in the natural rate, when uncertainty is initially at its highest. 7 Figure 2: Response of short-term nominal interest rate to a shock in the natural rate of interest.
The response of the short-term nominal interest rate under the active learning policy is initially muted when compared to the passive learning policy. However, the response is more persistent, remaining above baseline for longer under active than passive learning.
Beliefs and learning
To understand the economic intuition behind our result, it is useful to solve the IS curve (1) forward to obtain an expression showing how the current output gap is determined. According to equation (29), the output gap x t in our model is a function of the sum of current and future expected deviations of the real short-term interest rate, r t+j − E t ¼ t+j+1 , from the natural rate, r n t+j . In other words, the output gap is determined by the expected difference between the long-term real interest rate and the long-term natural rate.
The persistence in short-term nominal interest rates observed under passive learning is designed to exploit the fact that the output gap is determined by long-term rates. By introducing persistence in the short rate, the central bank gains more control over the long rate and a given change in the shortterm nominal interest rate will have a larger effect on the output gap. This is the subject of Woodford (1999) .
Under the active learning policy, short-term nominal interest rates are even more persistent than they were with the passive learning policy. The motivation for this is that a given change in the short-term nominal interest rate will then have a larger effect on the long-term rate and hence on the output gap. Table 2 The active learning policy induces greater volatility in the output gap because it is beneficial for learning. Increased volatility makes it easier for the central bank and private agents to learn the value of the structural parameter · t in the aggregate supply curve (2). 8 In our simulations, beliefs consequently converge faster to their true (extreme) values under active learning than passive learning. This explains the higher standard deviation of beliefs for the active learning policy in Table 2 . 
Interest rate reversals
The theme of the introduction to this paper was that learning creates an incentive to avoid interest rate reversals. In our simulations, the increased persistence in the short-run nominal interest rate does translate into less interest rate reversals under active than passive learning. Hence our claim that learning provides an additional motivation for why central banks should refrain from interest rate reversals. However, the number of interest rate reversals predicted by the model is high under both passive and active learning policies. In this respect, the predictions of the model do not match empirical data. A formal runs test rejects the hypothesis that actual US data could have been generated by the model under either passive or active learning. that, in such cases, learning can be detrimental to welfare. The optimal active learning policy is therefore designed to retard rather than promote learning.
Sensitivity analysis

Conclusions
We began this paper with the observation that central banks appear very reluctant to reverse their recent interest rate decisions. Our analysis suggests learning as an additional motivation for this behaviour. We show, in a standard monetary model with forward-looking expectations and uncertainty, that a policy which internalises learning (an active learning policy) leads to less interest rate reversals than a policy which ignores learning (a passive learning policy). The active learning policy has less interest rate reversals and more interest rate smoothing to give the central bank greater leverage over the long-term real interest rate. This greater control is used by the central bank to generate more volatility in the output gap, thereby promoting learning and improving welfare. The incentive to avoid interest rate reversals is in addition to the optimal policy inertia identified by Woodford (1999), Orphanides (1998) and Sack (2000) , for models with forward-looking expectations, data uncertainty and parameter uncertainty.
A First order conditions for optimal policy
We begin by deriving the first order conditions for optimality when the central bank follows an active learning policy. The Lagrangian (A.1) corresponds to the minimisation problem presented in equations (11) 
